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SENSATIONAL REPORTS: THE ETHICAL DUTY OF CAUSE
LAWYERS TO BE COMPETENT IN PUBLIC ADVOCACY
DeborahJ. Cantrell'
It seems that for some advocates, being invisible and not
drawing attention to their issue is seen as a kind of
strategy. .

.

. Many others know . . . that reticence and

invisibility are the problem, not the solution.
2
-Lawrence Wallack
I. INTRODUCTION
Some hundred years ago, Roscoe Pound complained that the
administration of justice was hampered by "sensational reports" from the
media regarding events that would ultimately be decided in the courts. 3 For
Pound, public advocacy was not the province of lawyers and he decried the
lawyer who was an "experienced player of a politico-procedural game .....4
Lawyers were best when they were highly educated, disciplined, and focused
on their responsibilities to carry a client's case successfully through trial. 5 It
is likely that if asked directly, Pound would have opined that an ethical
lawyer's only duty of competent advocacy was in the courts on behalf of a
particular client. Pound would not have accepted that the profession could
include lawyers who committed themselves not to particular clients, but to
particular causes, nor accepted that it was appropriate for any lawyer to have
a broad goal of social change.
For those practicing in the legal profession now, cause lawyers are
familiar and regularly-encountered. 6 Yet, there has not been much
consideration about the role of public advocacy for a cause lawyer. Is
Pound's proscription against public advocacy appropriate for cause lawyers
and should cause lawyers' advocacy be limited to courtrooms? Or, like
I
2

Senior Research Scholar, and Clinical Lecturer of Law, Yale Law School.
L. Wallack et al., News for a Change: An Advocate's Guide to Working With

the Media, SAGE Publications (1999).
3
Roscoe Pound, The Causes of PopularDissatisfactionwith the Administration
of Justice, address delivered at the 1906 annual convention of the American Bar Association
and reprinted in 46 J. AM. JUD. Soc. 55 (1962).
4
Roscoe Pound, CriminalJustice and the American City, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE
IN CLEVELAND 636 (R. Pound & F. Frankfurter, eds., 1922, reprinted 1968).
5
Id. at 601-03, 636-37.
6
See Jules Lobel, Courts as Forums for Protest, 52 UCLA L. Rev. 477 (2004)
(providing historical examples of cause lawyers, including abolitionists and suffragists); see
also Deborah J. Cantrell, A Short History of Poverty Lawyers in the United States, 5 Loy. J.
PUB. INT. L. 11 (2003) (detailing the rise of cause lawyering in the 1960's). Certainly there
were lawyers active during Pound's lifetime whom we would label "cause lawyers," but the
idea of a specialty bar dedicated to social change is a more recent development. See id.
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Pound's narrow vision of the profession, has his narrow view of advocacy
been passed by? This Article will argue that Pound's narrow view of
advocacy is inappropriate when applied to cause lawyers and cause lawyers
behave unethically if they do not integrate a public advocacy strategy into
their practice. This Article first suggests a working definition of "cause
lawyer." It will then consider two sources of competency duties for cause
lawyers: the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, and the goals of social
movement work. This Article concludes that despite some concerns about
appropriate line drawing, all ethical cause lawyers must be skilled in public
advocacy; two examples are provided that detail cause lawyering
organizations with competent public advocacy campaigns.
II. A STARTING POINT: WHO ARE CAUSE LAWYERS?
Prior to arguing that cause lawyers have special competency
requirements unlike those of other lawyers, one must understand what the
label "cause lawyer" means. The phrase, coined by Austin Sarat and Stuart
Scheingold, does not have a definite meaning agreed upon by all. 7 However,
one important component is that cause lawyers are "lawyers who commit
themselves and their legal skills to furthering a vision of the good society"
and are lawyers who "give[] priority to political ideology, public policy, and
moral commitment . . . [and to whom] [s]erving the client is but one
component of serving the cause." 8 At its core, "[c]ause lawyering ...is not
about neutrality but about choosing sides .... [C]ause lawyers are focused on
the broader stakes of litigation rather than on the justiciable conflict... or on
the narrow interests of the parties to that conflict."9
In contrast, the standard conception of a lawyer is someone who has
a professional duty of loyalty to a particular client, who has agreed to be the
partisan of the client, but who remains unattached to, and not accountable for,
the client's particular goals or moral decision-making. 10 Unlike cause
lawyers, traditional lawyers remain neutral regarding the "rightness" of the
client's "cause" while remaining wholly partisan in service of the client's
7

See Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold, Cause Lawyering and the Reproduction

of Professional Authority: An Introduction, in CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITCAL COMMITMENTS

1, 5 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold, eds., 1988)
Defining "cause lawyer" continues to generate a robust
discussion and this definition reflects the author's own experiences as a cause lawyer, a
clinician and a teacher reflecting with students about what it means to work for social change
as a lawyer.
8
Id. at 3-4.
9
Stuart Scheingold, The Struggle to Politicize Legal Practice:A Case Study of
AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
(hereinafter "CAUSE LAWYERING").

Left-Activist Lawyering in Seattle, in CAUSE LAWYERING at 118.
1o See generally, MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING

LAWYERS' ETHICS (LexisNexis 3d ed.) (2004) (providing a robust description of the standard
conception of a lawyer). For a detailed description contrasting the standard conception to a
conception akin to cause lawyering, and an argument in favor of the standard conception, see
Norman W. Spaulding, ReinterpretingProfessionalIdentity, 74 COLO. L. REv. 1 (2003).
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efforts to fulfill the cause. So long as the client is not asking the lawyer to
assist in a crime or fraud, the traditional lawyer passes no judgment on the
client's goals."
The second distinguishing feature of cause lawyers is that they
frequently consider themselves to be part of a social movement and
strategize along many advocacy dimensions, including lobbying, organizing,
and social protest, as well as traditional lawyering in the courts.12 They do
not understand themselves to be technicians called in by a client to create a
legally-cognizable document or to competently guide a matter through the
court system. Instead, they understand themselves to be part of a group
mobilizing for social change requiring a comprehensive, sophisticated
strategy that makes full use of a variety of advocacy tools. 13 Cause lawyers
actively embrace the political and policy dimensions of their' 4 work and
understand the importance of mobilization related to the "cause."'
Certainly occasions exist when traditional lawyers are also called
upon to consider the political and policy dimensions of a particular matter on
which they are working for a client. Consider, for example, the work of
lawyers representing tobacco manufacturers in negotiations with states'
attorneys general to settle pending litigation,' 5 or the example of an attorney
working on a case in which the defendant is a notable political figure or
charged with a politically-sensitive crime.' 6 Furthermore, it is not always
clear when an attorney is acting as a cause
lawyer or as a traditional lawyer.
17
At times, a lawyer may be doing both.

11 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2006) ("A lawyer shall
not . . . engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or
fraudulent ....).
12 See Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold, What Cause Lawyers Do For, and To,
Social Movements: An Introduction, in CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 1-12 (A.
Sarat & S. Scheingold, eds., Stanford University Press 2006); see also Michael McCann &
Helena Silverstein, Rethinking Law's "Allurements:" A Relational Analysis of Social
Movement Lawyers in the United States, in CAUSE LAWYERING 261, 266-72 (Austin Sarat &
Stuart Scheingold, eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1998).
13 See, e.g., McCann & Silverstein, supra note 12, at 266-74.
14 id.
15 See, e.g., Michael Givel & Stanton A. Glantz, The "Global Settlement" with
the Tobacco Industry: 6 Years Later, 94 AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH NO. 2 218-224 (2004)
(describing the terms of the tobacco settlement and the defeat of implementing legislation).
16
See, Elizabeth Amon, Defending Detainees, THE AMERICAN LAWYER,
September
1,
2004,
available
at
http://www.law.com/jsp/tal/PubArticle
TAL.jsp?id=1090180385542. Neal Katyal is a recent example of such an attorney. Id. He
has worked on several high profile cases involving persons detained after September 11 as
enemy combatants. Id.
17 See, e.g., Margareth Etienne, The Ethics of Cause Lawyering: An Empirical
Examination of CriminalDefense Lawyers as Cause Lawyers, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1195 (2005) (describing instances in which criminal defense lawyers act as both traditional
lawyers in service of a particular client and as cause lawyers in service of reforming the
criminal justice system).
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Nonetheless, traditional lawyers generally engage with the political,
policy and mobilizing dimensions solely as part of their technical service to
help a client reach a particular goal. While traditional lawyers may at times
behave like cause lawyers, their intent is different. The traditional lawyer
intends to be an exemplary technician in service of the particular client, and
achieving the client's individualized goals is the attorney's goal. A cause
lawyer intends to be an effective advocate on behalf of the cause and to craft
a global advocacy strategy in service of the cause. Achieving a goal for an
individual is the goal of a cause lawyer only if the individual's goal is in
harmony with the cause's goal.
III. COMPETENCY AS A CAUSE LAWYER: ASSESSMENT AND
SOME POSSIBLE COMPONENTS
The above description of cause lawyers, and its contrast with that of
traditional lawyers, raises two questions: what standards should be used to
assess the competency of a cause lawyer, and what constitutes a competent
cause lawyer? Given that the legal profession is regulated primarily under
state systems based on the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct
("Model Rules"), those Model Rules are an important starting point. 8 The
Model Rules may not be the only method of evaluating the competency of a
cause lawyer. A cause lawyer, situated within a broader social movement,
could also be evaluated along dimensions particular to the goals of a social
movement. For example, a cause lawyer working on litigation as part of the
feminist movement with a goal of restructuring the power hierarchy might be
evaluated both for her competency as a litigator and for her competency in
restructuring the power hierarchy in her own work place.
In fact, as this Article will develop more fully below, because of the
more expansive goals of cause lawyering, competency requires more of
cause lawyers. 19 Cause lawyers commit to integrating the legal, political,
policymaking and mobilizing work related to their cause. Cause lawyers are
not neutral representatives of the cause, but are integrated members who
commit as much to practicing behavior that moves their cause forward as
they do to using their legal skills on behalf of the cause. Thus, a cause
lawyer working on a living wage campaign, which does not pay its own staff
the proposed living wage, loses credibility and becomes a liability for the
campaign.
The knotty challenge for cause lawyers is appropriately calculating
what constitutes the baseline for competent behavior. Does a cause lawyer
working to unionize laborers have to be a skilled community organizer?
Does a cause lawyer working to promote open access to new technology
have to be a computer engineer? This Article may not resolve such
18
19

See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2006).

See infra notes 22-39 and accompanying text.
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particular questions, but it will stake out at least one area in which all cause
lawyers, regardless of their causes, must be competent - integrating a public
advocacy campaign into their cause work.
Note that the argument for competency is one of minimum expected
behavior, not one of possible and permissibly creative behavior. Put another
way, this Article argues that cause lawyers are behaving unethically if they
do not integrate a public advocacy campaign into their cause work. Since
cause lawyers affirmatively opt into work that is designed to push for social
change, they are working in an arena that may require different behavior of
them than would be required of a traditional lawyer.
The discussion will turn first to the Model Rules to consider what
they provide regarding competency, whether the Model Rules acknowledge
differences between traditional lawyers and cause lawyers, and whether the
Model Rules provide any specific guidance to cause lawyers about what
counts as competent behavior for them. 20 The discussion then considers
whether the broad goals of cause advocacy help delimit certain behavior
that
21
is required of cause advocates in order for them to be competent.
A. Competency Under Model Rule 1.1
Model Rule 1.1 provides that "[a] lawyer shall provide competent
representation to a client", and that to be competent, a lawyer must have the
"legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary
for the representation., 22 The commentary to the Rule specifies that the
relevant factors in determining whether a lawyer is competent to handle a
matter include "the relative complexity and specialized nature of the
matter .... , Furthermore, for a particular matter, lawyers should use the
"methods and procedures meeting the standards of competent
24
practitioners ... ." in those kinds of matters.
Model Rule 1.1 understands that what constitutes competent
representation can vary across kinds of work and acknowledges
"specialized" matters, and differing "methods and procedures. 25 Thus, Rule
1.1 envisions that lawyers are required to act in differing ways depending on
the kind of work they are doing. Rule 1.1 rejects the notion that competency
is a uniform concept across all kinds of law and all kinds of lawyers.
Furthermore, the inquiry about competency is calibrated to the field
of practitioners doing the particular work at issue. 2266 Competency in a

23

See infra notes 22-32 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 33-39 and accompanying text.
MODEL RULEs OF PROF'L CoNDucT R. 1.1 (2006).
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcT R. 1.1 cmt. 1 (2006).

24
25

MODELRULES OFPROF'LCONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt. 5 (2006).
MODEL RULES OFPROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt. 5 (2006).

26

See LAWRENCE J. Fox

20

21
22

&

SUSAN R. MARTYN, RED FLAGS: A LAWYER'S

HANDBOOK ON LEGAL ETFICS § 4.02 (ALI/ABA 2005).
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medical malpractice case is judged by looking at the "reasonably prudent"
lawyer who handles medical malpractice cases, not the reasonably prudent
lawyer who practices family law or even the reasonably prudent lawyer who
handles automobile-related personal injury cases.27 If Rule 1.1 requires
malpractice lawyers to assess their competency by looking to the reasonably
prudent lawyer in that field, then cause lawyers should assess their
competency by looking at reasonably prudent cause lawyers, and not by
looking at traditional lawyers. Nothing in Rule 1.1 permits a cause lawyer to
limit the scope of competency by saying "lawyers traditionally don't do
that."
However, nothing in Rule 1.1 or other Model Rules directly
acknowledges that there is any kind of lawyer except for a lawyer who is
focused on representing a particular client. Rule 1.1 talks only of lawyers
providing competent representation to clients and is contained in the section
titled "Client-Lawyer Relationship. 28 The Model Rules consider "client" to
include individuals and organizations, 29 but are silent on whether causes or
social movements could be "clients., 30 At best, the Model Rules create some
space for lawyers to be more than just lawyers. For example, the Preamble
acknowledges that lawyers are "public citizen[s]" who "should seek
improvement of the law, access to the legal system, [and] the administration
of justice ... . Under the Model Rules, a lawyer's "day job" is to work
with clients, and other social change work is to be done on one's own time.
Thus, in a fundamental way, the Model Rules provide little guidance
to cause lawyers on what counts as competent behavior. The cause lawyer is
told to look out to the community of cause lawyers, find someone who is
reasonably prudent and use that lawyer as a model. The cause lawyer should
use appropriate methods and procedures, and the cause lawyer should adjust
his or her actions based on whether the work involves a specialized matter.
27 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.0(h) (2006). "Reasonably prudent" is
the phrase used by the Model Rules to define "reasonable" or "reasonably" as it relates to a
lawyer's conduct. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.0(h) (2006).

client).

28
29

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1-1.18 (2006).
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2006) (listing an organization as a

30

There are some who argue that the Model Rules' silence is not caused by lack

of attention, but by a specific decision that lawyers work best in our legal system if they act as
an advocate for a particular client involved in a particular transaction or dispute. See, e.g.,
Spiro Agnew, What's Wrong with the Legal Services Program, 58 AM. BAR Ass'N J. 930
(1972) (noting that, while not mentioning the Model Rules in particular, Agnew argues that
the fundamental point of the attorney-client relationship is for the attorney to work in service
of a particular client and to avoid social reform work). Others have well-articulated the need
for cause lawyers, and this Article will not restate those arguments. This Article starts from
the proposition that cause lawyers are legitimate legal actors. See, e.g., Margaret Etienne, The
Ethics of Cause Lawyering: An Empirical Examination of Criminal Defense Lawyers as

Cause Lawyers, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1195 (2005) (arguing in support of cause
lawyering and examining whether criminal defense lawyers act as cause lawyers).
31 MODEL RULES OF PROF' L CONDUCT Preamble [6] (2006).
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Given that the Model Rules provide only general guidance, a cause lawyer
must look elsewhere for guidance on what particular behavior will be
required for the cause lawyer to behave competently. Because a cause
lawyer is embedded in the "cause," it is appropriate to look at the goals of
cause lawyering and its methods and procedures, to determine whether
certain behavior is called for by cause lawyers that would not be required of
32
non-cause lawyers.
B. Competency Derivedfrom the Goals of Cause Lawyering
Broadly considered, the goal of cause work is to bring about
systemic social change through multiple methods that are based on strategic
assessments regarding which method is most likely to be effective at a
particular time. At any given time, cause advocates may be pursuing
strategies which include community organizing, educational outreach,
legislative advocacy and legal advocacy.33 Each strategy requires certain
skills to be effective. For example, community organizing requires the
organizer to be a good listener in order to competently hear the concerns of
those with whom the organizer is working.34 Public education requires the
advocate to be skilled in adult learning techniques and to properly assess the
level at which to set teaching materials. To be a competent cause advocate
- meaning to effectively bring about social change - the cause advocate must
understand and learn the particular skills required by the advocacy method to
be used.
The common thread among the strategies mentioned above is that
each has some public element. Therefore, cause advocates may frequently
find themselves in a variety of public spaces including courtrooms, state
houses, community centers, newspapers, and the internet. 36 Cause advocates
32

This Article starts the conversation about competent behavior that can fairly be

assigned to all cause lawyers, regardless of the particular cause served. However, one would
refine that analysis by also looking to the goals, methods and procedures of the particular
cause being served by the lawyer, just as traditional lawyers who have a specialty look to their
particular area of the law for refinement.
33
See, e.g., Institute for Justice, http://ij.org/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2007). An
example is the work of the Institute for Justice on eminent domain where the organization has
focused on litigating eminent domain cases, but includes grassroots mobilizing (the Castle
Coalition) in its overall strategy. Id. The Institute's website seamlessly moves between
information about litigation and organizing. Id.
See, e.g., Community Listening, http://www.hope-community.org/innovation/
34
communitylistening/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2007) (detailing projects organized by Hope
Community, a nonprofit community organizing group in Minneapolis, Minnesota).
3
See Deborah J. Cantrell, Justicesfor the Interests of the Poor: The Problem of
Navigating the System Without Counsel, 70 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1573 (2002) (arguing that pro
se materials must be tailored to be effective for particular audiences).
36
See, e.g., Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siege, Equal Protectionby Law: Federal
Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441 (2000)
(describing an argument for liberal Supreme Court justices to use dissenting in cases in which
conservative Justices found that Congress had not acted appropriately under Section 5 of the
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must not squander their time in public space and must be skilled in crafting
an effective strategy to benefit from these opportunities. Furthermore, cause
lawyers often are the advocates in the public space.37 By virtue of licensing
requirements, they are common voices in the courtrooms. By virtue of
training, they are common voices in the legislatures. 38 By virtue of
accessibility (among other reasons), they are common voices in the press.
To be a cause lawyer means that one should expect to be a public voice on
behalf of the cause.
As such, cause lawyers must be competent in public arenas.
Lawyers expect to be competent inside the courts, as that is their traditional
and expected arena. 9 Lawyers are not surprised if called upon to be
competent negotiating in legislative backrooms or speaking in the legislative
chamber given the high percentage of lawyers involved in legislative work
and given the similarity of that work with traditional lawyering. Lawyers,
however, have not generally understood that competency requires them to
craft a "public voice" outside their traditional forums. For cause lawyers to
properly serve the goal of social change, they must ensure that their
particular work includes a public advocacy strategy and that they, as frequent
voices for their cause, have the necessary skills to see the public advocacy
strategy through.
IV. SOME PUSH BACK: ARGUMENTS AGAINST CAUSE
LAWYERS AS PUBLIC ADVOCACY STRATEGISTS
Lawyers have had a somewhat contentious relationship with being
public voices, especially media voices, and there are three primary concerns
that may be raised in opposition to lawyers as public advocacy strategists.
First, if a lawyer's advocacy work will be of interest to the public, is it not a
better course for a lawyer to hire an expert in public relations to handle that
aspect of the work? Second, are not cause lawyers restricted from too much
public advocacy work by the ABA's Model Rule 3.6 regarding trial
publicity? 4° Finally, if a lawyer must be competent in public advocacy, does

Fourteenth Amendment). Note that cause advocates may use public periodicals as ways of
"speaking" to certain audiences, such as judges, who otherwise could not be approached with
persuasive writing outside the context of a particular case. Id.
37 See McCann & Silverstein, note 12, supra, at 262-74. Critics of cause lawyers
complain that lawyers too often dominate movement strategy and confine it too narrowly to
litigation. Id. However, research suggests that cause lawyers do not so constrain movement
work. Id.
38
See, e.g., The National Center for Public Policy Research, available at
http://www.nccppr.org/lobby.pdf (last visited February 23, 2007) (stating that in state
legislatures, lawyers are the largest occupational group at, on average, 15%).
39 See, e.g., THOMAS A. MAUET, TRIAL TECHNIQUES (6th ed. 2002) (a training
manual on how to effectively advocate at trial).
See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.6 (2006) (discussing trial
40
publicity).
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that not open the door to requiring lawyers to be competent in many other
non-legal skills, ultimately making the role of the lawyer unmanageable?
A. Why Lawyers and Not a Public Relations Expert?
The first argument against cause lawyers as public advocacy
strategists is one of specialization. There are trained professionals whose job
it is to work with the public, including the media, and to craft a public
advocacy strategy. Is it not better to have such an expert doing the work than
to have a lawyer who is not an expert doing the work? The argument
concedes that public advocacy work is important in cause advocacy, but does
not put the responsibility for a public advocacy strategy on the cause lawyer.
First, nothing prevents cause advocates from having a public
advocacy strategist as part of the advocacy team. In fact, most cause lawyers
understand themselves to be part of a larger group of strategists, all of whom
are cooperating to determine appropriate movement goals and advocacy
campaigns. 4 1 Thus, cause lawyers are free to look to public advocacy experts
to help craft such strategies.4 2
Nonetheless, as noted above, cause lawyers are often the public
voice for the cause by virtue of the places in which they perform their
advocacy work. When a cause lawyer walks out of the courtroom after
winning a case or legal argument, and the media is waiting, it is the cause
lawyer who must be prepared and competent to answer the media's
questions.4 3 When a cause lawyer goes to a community center to teach a
"know your rights" class, it is the cause lawyer who is the public face of the
advocacy effort. 44 In many situations, the cause lawyer cannot duck the
responsibility of being part of the public voice on behalf of the cause. Thus,
while cause lawyers need not be the only advocates skilled in public
advocacy, they at least must be part of the group of advocates with such
skills.
41

See, e.g., McCann & Silverstein, supra note 12, at 274-76 (discussing the

integration of lawyers, client and other movement advocates).
42
For example, the cause advocacy organization, Legal Momentum, has a vicepresident of communications who is not a lawyer.
See Legal Momentum,
http:/Aegalmomentum.org/legalmomentumaboutus/2006/03/maureen-mcfadden-vice-preside
ntcommunications.php (last visited Feb. 27, 2007).
43
See, e.g., Institute for Justice: Private Property Rights Cases: Kelo v. New
London, http://ij.org/private-property/connecticut/index.html (illustrating in an eminent
domain case that, in addition the lawyer's need to be competent on the courthouse steps, the
client, as a particular "face" for the cause, must be prepared for that role and be visible and
accessible to the media).
44 See Deborah J. Cantrell, The Obligation of Legal Aid Lawyers to Champion
Practice by NonLawyers., 73 FORDHAM L. REv. 883 (2004) (discussing that lawyers are not
the only cause advocates who could conduct a "know your rights" class, but it is often lawyers
who will be called upon to lead sessions in which the parameters of legal rights are being
discussed - in part because the audience may expect to hear from an expert, and in part
because of concerns that non-lawyers may be accused of unauthorized practice of law).

PUBLIC ADVOCACY

20071

B. The Restrictions Under Model Rule 3.6
ABA Model Rule 3.6 regulates lawyers' conduct related to trial
publicity. 45 The Rule provides that when a lawyer is "participating or has
participated in the investigation or litigation of a matter," the lawyer is
prohibited from making a public statement that "will have a substantial
likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding in the
matter., 46 Rule 3.6 provides safe harbors for both civil and criminal cases,
listing particular information on which an attorney may discuss publicly.4 7
For example, a civil attorney may speak about the claims involved in the
case, any information from a public record, or any outcome of a "step" in the
litigation.48
What is notable about Rule 3.6 is that, in the end, it restricts an
attorney in limited and modest ways. 49 For example, Rule 3.6 applies only
when an attorney investigates or litigates a case.50 Attorneys not involved in
a particular case are exempt from the restrictions, as are attorneys who are
not speaking about a particular case. 51 Similarly, even when an attorney is
litigating a matter, the attorney is permitted to speak about much of what
would be of interest to the media, or of what would be necessary to the
lawyer in crafting a media strategy.5 2 The lawyer may talk about the facts in
the record, the claims of the case and the outcome of any "step" in the
litigation, not just court rulings.
For all lawyers, not just cause lawyers, Rule 3.6 is rarely an obstacle
to having a media strategy. In fact, for cause lawyers who are involved in
implementing a multi-pronged advocacy strategy, Rule 3.6 is almost
irrelevant. Consider an advocacy strategy that starts first with community
organizing and community education, and then moves to legislative
45

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.6 (2006).
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.

3.6(a) (2006).
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.6(b)-(c) (2006).
48
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.6(b) (2006).
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Rule 3.6 is relatively toothless in part because lawyers have successfully
challenged more restrictive versions as violating their first amendment rights. A discussion
about the first amendment parameters is beyond the scope of this Article, but interested
readers maK wish to review Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991).
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.6(a) (2006).
51 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.6(a) (2006). The comment to that
Rule notes:
Recognizing that the public value of informed commentary is great and
the likelihood of prejudice to a proceeding by the commentary of a lawyer
who is not involved in the proceeding is small, the rule applies only to
lawyers who are, or who have been involved in the investigation or
litigation of a case, and their associates.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.6 cmt. 3 (2006).
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MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.6(b) (2006).
53 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.6(b) (2006).
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advocacy and only in the end moves to litigation. A cause lawyer would
have no restrictions on his or her speech under Rule 3.6 until the lawyer
began to investigate and prepare for the final advocacy strategy of litigation.
Further, even in litigation, the cause lawyer would be unrestricted in
speaking about the "cause" unrelated to the litigation.5 4 Thus, Rule 3.6 does
not impede cause lawyers from crafting a public advocacy strategy, and a
competent cause lawyer, under Rule 1.1, will actively participate in the
crafting and implementation of such a strategy.
C. The Slippery Slope Problem
The final concern about requiring cause lawyers to be competent in
public advocacy is that it moves lawyers down the slope of being required to
be competent in non-legal skills. Under the argument, once lawyers start the
move down the slope of non-legal competency, there is no way to draw a
finish line and lawyers will be saddled inappropriately and unreasonably
with too many non-legal responsibilities. As with many slippery slope
arguments, the concern raised may be quickly dispensed with.
First, the argument in support of cause lawyers being competent in
public advocacy is tied to the specific characteristics of what it means to be a
cause lawyer. Recall that Rule 1.1 understood that competency could require
different skills depending on the specialty area in which a lawyer practices.
Cause lawyers are required to be competent in public advocacy because the
particular requirements of cause lawyering make it extremely likely that a
cause lawyer will be a public voice for the cause.55 Because one determines
whether a specialty skill is required by focusing on the particular work
performed by the specialty lawyer, there is little risk that the inquiry would
find that the lawyer must be competent in a skill that is irrelevant to the
specialty. For example, a cause lawyer working on drug reform issues would
not likely have to be competent in financial accounting. In contrast, a lawyer
working on corporate financial disclosure matters may need to be.
In order to refute the slippery slope argument, this discussion need
not draw all competency lines for all kinds of specialty attorneys. It need
only show that there is a principled way to draw lines. Rule 1.1's
consideration of specialty "methods and procedures" combined with an
inquiry about broader goals of the work being performed by the specialty
lawyer, provides such a principled rubric. Applied in this case, considering
that cause lawyers work for social change through multiple advocacy
methods, many of which use public forums, one can draw a line that requires
cause lawyers to be competent in public advocacy.
54
This is not to suggest that a cause lawyer may be cavalier about Rule 3.6, and
need not consider whether her "cause" talk could be reasonably taken to be about the
particular litigation. This Article only argues that Rule 3.6 provides much room in which a
cause lawyer can work heavily on a public advocacy strategy.
55
See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
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After discussing the concerns about cause lawyers and public
advocacy, this Article will now consider some examples of cause lawyers
with competent public advocacy strategies. 56 What counts as a competent
public advocacy strategy? Is it knowing how to craft press releases? Is it
getting the name of one's organization in the local paper? Is it moving
beyond building "face time" in the media and, instead, considering the role
of public opinion in how one achieves the goals of the cause on which one is
working? This Article argues for the latter - a broad and comprehensive
consideration of the interaction between the media, public sentiment,
mobilization, and the social change agenda on behalf of which the cause
lawyer is working.
V. TWO EXAMPLES OF CAUSE LAWYERING AND PUBLIC
ADVOCACY COMPETENCY
Legal Momentum is a cause lawyering organization whose mission
is to "advance[] the rights of women and girls by using the power of the law
and creating innovative public policy." 5 It articulates its goal for social
change as reaching "a society in which women control their own lives and
make their own decisions about reproduction, family life and work, and
enjoy safety and economic security throughout their lives." 58 Legal
Momentum includes legal staff, public policy staff, public education and
outreach staff, a judicial education staff, and communications staff.59 Legal
Momentum is based in New York City, but works nationally.
Institute for Justice is a cause lawyering organization whose mission
is to "advance[] a rule of law under which individuals can control their
destinies as free and responsible members of society." 6 It articulates its goal
for social change as working to:
secure economic liberty, school choice, private property
rights, freedom of speech and other vital individual liberties
and to restore constitutional limits on the power of
government . . . [and to] challenge[] the ideology of the
welfare state and illustrate[] and extend[] the benefits of

See infra notes 57-104 and accompanying text.
57 See Legal Momentum, http://legalmomentum.org/legalmomentum/aboutus/
(last visited Feb. 23, 2007). Legal Momentum was formerly known as the NOW Legal
Defense & Education Fund.
See Legal Momentum, http://legalmomentum.org/legal
momentum/aboutus/legal-momentums history/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2007).
58
See Legal Momentum, http://legalmomentum.org/legalmomentum/aboutus/
mission and vision-statement/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2007).
59
See Legal Momentum, http://legalmomentum.org/legalmomentum/aboutus/
staff/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2007).
60
See Institute for Justice, Institute Mission, http://ij.org/profile/index.html (last
visited Feb. 23, 2007).
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whose full enjoyment of liberty is denied
freedom to those
61
by government.
Institute for Justice includes legal staff, strategic research staff, coalitionbuilding staff, and communications staff.62 Institute for Justice is based in
Washington, D.C., but works nationally.63
A. Legal Momentum and Public Advocacy
For some twenty to twenty-five years, Legal Momentum has
advocated on behalf of women working in non-traditional jobs. 64 For
example, Legal Momentum was involved in the 1988 lawsuit filed by
women mineworkers in Minnesota that formed the story portrayed in the film,
North Country. 65 Similarly, Legal Momentum participated in a sex
discrimination class action lawsuit filed by Brenda Berkman against the New
York Fire Department ("FDNY"), which resulted in Ms. Berkman joining
FDNY in 1982.66 Around the time of Ms. Berkman's lawsuit, Legal
Momentum used the media in a limited and predictable way - mainly issuing
press releases related to its work and self-producing an organizational
newsletter. 67 Rather than having a campaign that considered public
advocacy as one of several strategies coordinated and deployed to achieve its
goal of promoting and supporting women in non-traditional jobs, the
organization appeared to limit public advocacy to the realm of public
relations.
In March 2001, Legal Momentum brought on a vice-president of
communications. 6 8 The organization determined that it needed to better
understand and develop a public advocacy component for each of its
campaigns and to utilize public advocacy for more than just building name
62

Id.
See Institute for Justice, http://ij.org/staff/index.html (last visited Feb. 23,

63

See Institute for Justice, http://ij.org/contact/map.html (last visited Feb. 23,

61

2007).
2007).

64 E-mail from Maureen McFadden, Legal Momentum's Vice-President for
Communications (Feb. 2, 2007) (hereinafter "McFadden Email") (on file with author).
65
Id. See also Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 130 F.3d 1287 (8th Cir. 1997).
66
See Berkman v. City of New York, 812 F.2d 52 (2nd Cir. 1987) (holding that
the firefighters' fitness test was invalid and inappropriately discriminated against women).
67
See, e.g., Legal Momentum, NOW Legal Defense & Education Fund June 2002

Newsletter, available at http://www.legalmomentum.org/news/ib/02-june/nyccouncil.shtml
(mentionin the organization's role in Ms. Berkman's lawsuit).
Maureen McFadden,
Vice President,
Telephone
interview with
Communications, Legal Momentum (Jan. 16, 2007) (hereinafter "McFadden Interview")
(notes on file with the author). Note that Ms. McFadden is not a lawyer, but is a media expert.
This is a good example of a cause lawyering organization integrating a media advocacy expert
into its strategy team. For Ms. McFadden's biography, see Legal Momentum, About Us,
http://www.legalmomentum.org/legalmomentumaboutus/2006/03/maureen-mcfadden-vicepresident communications.php (last visited Feb. 23, 2007).
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recognition for the organization. 69 A handful of months after it built out its
public advocacy team, September 11 occurred and the organization was
presented with an unexpected opportunity to focus the public on the
importance of women working in non-traditional jobs.
Of course, women were included among the first responders to the
disaster at the World Trade Center - as firefighters, police officers and
paramedics.
Firefighter Brenda Berkman was one such responder. 7 1
Before September 11, Legal Momentum had been considering whether it
needed to bring a further lawsuit against FDNY to combat continued sex
discrimination on the force.72 However, it was clear after September 11 that
New York's firefighters had suffered tragic losses and that suing FDNY
would not be strategically positive. Thus, Legal Momentum instead crafted a
sophisticated media strategy to publicize the fact that women work in nontraditional jobs and were to be found among the heroes at Ground Zero. The
campaign kicked off with a documentary film produced by Legal
Momentum's communications department called "The Women of Ground
Zero. 7 3 The documentary film received air74time on the national networks
and was screened at a reception for Congress.
Using impetus from "The Women of Ground Zero," Legal
Momentum was able to expand its campaign to include women in nontraditional jobs who were involved in rebuilding efforts. 75 It started a
campaign called "Women Rebuild" designed both to reach out to women in
the trades (such as carpenters, plumbers, and electricians), and to increase
visibility of women working in non-traditional jobs. 76 The campaign has
been renamed "Equality Works" and the campaign's director is the vicepresident of communications. The campaign is not limited to a media
strategy, but includes litigation77 and public education.7 8
69
70

See McFadden Interview, supra note 68.
See THE WOMEN OF GROUND ZERO, Legal Momentum (on file with author) (a

documentary film produced by Legal Momentum).
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Id.
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See McFadden Interview, supra note 68; McFadden Email, supra note 64.
See Legal Momentum, http://www.legalmomentum.org/news/ib/O2_march/
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groundzero.shtml.
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Id.

THE WOMEN OF GROUND ZERO, Legal Momentum (on file with author). "The
Women of Ground Zero" included clips from women working in the trades, including a
carpenter and an electrician, and noted that not only were women active as first responders,
but were also an integral part of the beginning efforts at rebuilding. Id.
76 See, e.g., Legal Momentum, Equality Works Program- About Equality Works,
http://www.legalmomentum.org/legalmomentum/programs/equalityworks/about-equality-wo
rks/ (noting the renaming of "Women Rebuild" to "Equality Works"); see also Legal
Momentum, Equality Works Program, http://www.legalmomentum.org/legalmomentum/
programs/equalityworks/ (describing the goals of the Equality Works Program).
77
See Legal Momentum, Equality Works Program - Court Cases,
http://www.legalmomentum.org/legalmomentumlprograms/equalityworks/court-cases/
(listing the campaign's legal cases).
75
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Legal Momentum's Equality Works campaign has integrated its
various advocacy methods so that each may be used at the times it will be
most effective. Most importantly, the public advocacy component of
Equality Works is sophisticated, speaking to many audiences. For example,
the documentary film was used: (1) as a way to increase the general public's
awareness of women firefighters; (2) as an advocacy tool for federal
legislative work; and (3) as a way to honor and support individual women
like Brenda Berkman who have long worked with Legal Momentum on
issues related to women in non-traditional employment. 79 Legal Momentum
uses public advocacy as part of its attempt to reach the broader goals of its
cause - to have women control their lives and enjoy economic security.
Furthermore, having a fully-developed public advocacy strategy has
permitted Legal Momentum to piggyback on other events and use those
events to promote its own cause-related goals. For example, in March 2006,
Legal Momentum wanted to publicize a decision by the Department of
Justice ("DOJ") to expand a race discrimination investigation of FDNY to
include sex discrimination. 80 The news media had been uninterested in the
story on its own, but Legal Momentum's vice-president of communications
knew that PBS was about to air a documentary about the first women
firefighters in New York City. 8' By tying together the DOJ expanded
investigation story and the PBS premier, Legal Momentum was able to get
the press interested in writing a story. The story quoted Brenda Berkman,
Legal Momentum's vice-president of communications, its legal director, and
discussed that the issue of discrimination against women as firefighters was
not limited to New York City.82 The Associated Press picked up the piece

and ran it nationally. 83 By having an integrated public advocacy strategy,
Legal Momentum was able to capitalize on events that were not particularly
related to any of its pending litigation nor related to any specific action the
organization had taken. Through public advocacy, Legal Momentum got
national coverage and visibility for women firefighters, thereby increasing
the possibilities for the general public to consider the ways in which women
participate in the workforce.84
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(providing examples of the campaign's public education materials).
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See McFadden Interview, supra note 68; McFadden Email, supra note 64.
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Marcus Franklin, Feds Investigate DiscriminationCharges in New York Fire

Department, NEWSDAY, March 15, 2006.

See McFadden Email, supra note 64.
See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan et. al, Gender, Race, and Risk Perception: The
Influence of Cultural Status Anxiety, 1st Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies,
availableat http://ssm.com/abstract=723762 (last visited Feb. 27, 2007). A critical concern of
any media advocacy strategy must be whether the resulting media pieces actually change the
minds of readers. Id. That is a question of cognitive psychology and beyond the scope of this
Article, but it is an issue that cause lawyers must consider and be knowledgeable about. There
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B. Institute for Justice and Public Advocacy
The Institute for Justice ("U") describes itself as a "libertarian public
interest law firm.",85 In describing its advocacy work, U states that it
"pursuels] cutting-edge litigation in the courts of law and in the court of
public opinion . ,, 6 From the outset, U makes it clear that it understands
cause lawyers to be equally responsible for advocacy in traditional legal
forums and in the forum of public discourse. 87 When U started in 1991, it
studied existing cause lawyering organizations that had been highly
successful, such as the ACLU and the NAACP Legal Defense & Education
Fund. 8 U noted that those organizations had integrated public advocacy into
their work and U believed the public advocacy work to have significantly
contributed to the organizations' successes.8 99 Thus, U took that lesson and
adopted it for its own cause advocacy agenda. 0
Because U considers itself to be a "litigation shop," its advocacy
campaign highlights court-based work, but that work is buttressed by public
outreach and strategic research. 9 1 U trains all of its lawyers as media
spokespeople, and when hiring a new attorney, considers whether the
attorney will be able to competently work with the media.92 When U begins
work on a new issue, its advocacy staff crafts a global strategy.93 Early on,
its staff creates a set of "strategic overriding communications objectives" or
"SOCO's" related to the particular issue that all advocacy staff, including
clients, will learn and use during the course of the advocacy campaign. 94 An
example of U's integrated advocacy model is its work on eminent domain.
Around 1996, U started its eminent domain work by representing
Vera Coking in a lawsuit against Atlantic City challenging the city's taking
of her property so that Donald Trump could develop the land.95 In 1998, the
trial court ruled against the city finding that the taking was not for a public

is an active group of psychologists and legal scholars working on issues of cultural cognition
and cause lawyers must become familiar with their work. Id.; see also Yale Law School,
Cultural
Cognition
Project,
http://research.yale.edu/culturalcognition/component/
option,com.frontpage/Itemid, 1/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2007).
85
Institute for Justice, http://ij.org/profile/index.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2007).
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(Jan. 19, 2007) (hereinafter "Bullock Interview") (notes on file with the author).
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94

http://ij.orglprivate-property/atlantic-cityl

HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:3

purpose.96 After Ms. Coking's case, U began receiving an increasing number
of inquiries from across the country alerting U to similar eminent domain
cases. 97 U proceeded to litigate selected cases across the country, including
challenges in Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania; New London, Connecticut; and
98
Canton, Mississippi.
In 2001, U determined that it needed to consider a systemic
campaign regarding eminent domain to bolster the individual litigation
underway. 99 It began to collect data on the scope of eminent domain
proceedings across the country in order to produce a public report.'l° The
report ultimately was published in 2003.0' It provided U with a way to
quantify the "problem" of eminent domain, and to argue to the public that its
various lawsuits were not isolated incidents, but examples of a broad pattern
of bad government behavior. With the report, U added a global story of
eminent domain abuse to its individualized stories - there were Vera Cokings
across America, not just in Atlantic City.
While the data collection was proceeding, U also launched a public
education effort, the "Castle Coalition," as a way to train local citizens in
grassroots activism related to eminent domain. 10 2 Anyone can join the Castle
Coalition for no charge and receive a monthly newsletter (called the
"CastleWatch"), legislative action alerts, and invitations to training
conferences. 103 Those interested may get an "Eminent Domain Abuse
Survival Guide." 1°4
The Castle Coalition is staffed and maintained by U. It reflects U's
serious commitment of time and resources to integrating media and public
education into its cause lawyering. There is a seamless connection between
the various advocacy methods that U uses to push its eminent domain work,
and, more broadly, to push for the social change it desires.
Legal Momentum and U illustrate the ways in which cause lawyers
build out public advocacy strategies. Each organization has taken a slightly
different approach, but underlying both approaches is the understanding that
the social change happens more effectively if the organization actively uses
public forums. Furthermore, the activities that form the organizations'
public advocacy strategy are broad - working with traditional media such as
See id.
Bullock Interview, supra note 88.
Id; see Institute for Justice, http://ij.org/private property/index.html (last
visited Feb. 23, 2007).
99 Bullock Interview, supra note 88.
1oo Id.
101 Id.
102 E-mail from Scott Bullock, Senior Attorney, Institute for Justice (Jan. 29, 2007)
96

97
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(on file with author).
103 CastleCoalition.org, Join the Castle Coalition, http://www.castlecoalition.org/
join/
104 CastleCoalition.org,
Eminent
Domain
Abuse
Survival
Guide,
http://www.castlecoalition.org/survival-guide/index.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2007).
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newspapers, creating comprehensive websites, self-producing quantitative
public reports, self-producing documentary films, and launching grassroots
organizing groups. Public advocacy is not just producing a press release or
talking to a report on the courthouse steps.
VII. CONCLUSION
Cause lawyers are different. They are specialty lawyers who commit
to working on behalf of a cause, not on behalf of an individual. As specialty
lawyers, the standards that constitute competent, ethical behavior are set by
looking at the methods and practices within their specialty, cause lawyering.
The methods and practices of cause lawyering include using multiple
advocacy methods in ways that will most effectively bring about social
change. Those multiple advocacy methods often include public forums, such
as the steps of a government building, streets and sidewalks, community
centers, halls of the legislature, or a television talk show. Due to this reality
cause lawyers are often called upon to be a voice for the cause, and as
competent practitioners, they must be skilled in public advocacy. This is not
optional or exceptional behavior; it is baseline, ordinary behavior.

